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Abstract 
The number of environmental catastrophes is rising, mostly owing to an 
increase in hydrometeorological hazards. The number of disasters is 
escalating as the world population grows and people settle in marginal areas. 
In order to improve preparedness, the geological and archaeological records 
must be investigated as they hold a wider range of possible events than the 
much shorter instrumental record. Catastrophes will gain amplitude with rapid 
onset, long duration, larger affected area, inflexible society and, of cause, 
convergence of threats. Too often, it seems that today’s societies resist 
learning from the past and therefore tend to repeat errors. A new field of 
science is emerging: the science of environmental catastrophes, which 
requires not only robust chronologies to firmly link cause and effect, but also 
bridges the crossing between the geosciences and social sciences. 
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Introduction 
Natural hazards are an integral component of life on Earth (ICSU, 2005). The 
number of recorded natural hazards has increased in the last fifty years with 
the greatest increase in frequency attributed to hydrometeorological disasters, 
with a lesser increase attributed to biological disasters and a slightly lesser 
increase attributed to geological disasters (ICSU, 2005). Moreover, the 
number of natural hazards culminating in disasters also has tremendously 
increased. Natural disasters were especially prolific in 2005 following the 
Indian Ocean tsunami (December 2004), often occurring at catastrophic levels 
(e.g. the Pakistan/India earthquake and Hurricane Katrina over the US Gulf 
Coast). Quite timely, international interest in the geological and archaeological 
fields has focussed since 2002 on the theme of rapid and catastrophic 
environmental changes and human and ecosystem responses occurring in 
the last millennia. 
In this paper I aim to present the results of a series of scientific meetings 
where various challenges and questions are discussed, especially concerning 
the record of ancient catastrophes, need to work in multidisciplinary teams, 
time resolution with geological and archaeological data, relevance to modern 
societies, and new forces that can help humans adapt in order to prevent 
civilisations from collapsing. After an initial meeting at Brunel University (West 
London, UK) in 2002 (Leroy and Stewart, 2002), international scientific 
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societies have provided support to further discuss these topics in the 
framework of the International Geological Correlation Program 490 (IGCP 
490, 2006) and the International Council of Sciences (ICSU, 2006) Dark 
Nature conference project in 2004 and 2005 with meetings in Mauritania 
(Leroy and Costa, 2004; Leroy et al., 2006 a and b), Mozambique, Argentina 
(Piovano et al., in prep.), Iran, Canada and Italy (Michetti et al., 2005) (all 
abstracts available at ICSU, 2006). Humans also cause environmental 
catastrophes, but this is not the theme of this research, which only serves to 
examine natural events. 
1 What constitutes an environmental catastrophe? 
According to the ICSU, for the period 1994–2003, floods represented 33 % of 
the natural hazards, storms 23 %, epidemics 15.2 %, droughts 15 %, 
earthquakes 7 %, tsunamis 7 %, landslides 4.5 % and volcanic eruptions 1.4 
%, whereas avalanches accounted only for 0.7 % of the total number of 
events (ICSU, 2005). Hazards related to extreme weather conditions occurred 
most frequently and often affected the largest areas. Most of these events 
lead to disasters but did not led necessarily to environmental catastrophes.  
1.1 Definitions and non-linearity in societal responses 
We could attempt to define an environmental catastrophe, such as a natural 
hazard combined with a large disaster, the latter including measurable human 
and economical costs (e.g. death, infrastructure destruction, cultural impact, 
financial loss). In its definition of natural disaster, the International Human 
Dimension Programme (IHDP) stresses that it is more a function of vulnerable 
people than severity in the natural hazard (Lonergan et al., 1999). An 
environmental catastrophe also could be defined as a rapid departure from 
normality where humans and/or ecosystems cannot adapt. However, 
catastrophic events do not always occur rapidly. In addition, these events may 
be, in some cases, more pervasive at the societal scale and, retrospectively, 
seen as catastrophes. At times, it is difficult to separate catastrophes from 
―normal‖ environmental events, since the environment is never stable, but 
always undergoing modification: ―Not nature in balance, but nature in flux‖ 
(Berger, 2006). 
A large cause (environmental hazard) may produce only a small effect 
(disaster) and vice versa. Societal responses to external forces are non-linear 
in nature; hence, in the geoarchaeological record, assumption of causality 
between cultural transition and natural hazard often is questionable (Coombes 
and Barber, 2005) and must be used with care. 
1.2 Combination of factors 
The three factors contributing to the amplitude of an environmental 
catastrophe include time, area and societal characteristics (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: A catastrophe results from the combination of time, area and 
societal characteristics 
1.2.1 Onset rapidity and duration 
The time factor (sharp onset and overall duration) is an essential 
consideration in defining an environmental catastrophe (Figure 1). First, the 
usual high speed of change makes it impossible for humans to adapt unless 
preparedness plans are in place. Second, events of longer duration result in 
greater damage: for example an environmental change that extends beyond 
the food storage capacity of a society. Recent estimates indicate the global 
supply of grains, if not replenished, would last barely two months (Rampino, 
2005). After a nuclear war or volcanic winter, it has ―emerged that the main 
cause of disaster would be destruction of global agriculture and food supply‖ 
(Sparks, Self et al., 2005). ―After a year of severely reduced food supply, there 
would be mass starvation. Because a nuclear [or volcanic] winter might last 
two or three years, scientists concluded that this would threaten the continued 
existence of civilisation (and possibly even our species)‖ (Sparks, Self et al., 
2005).  
1.2.2 Area  
An environmental catastrophe affecting a large area (typical of a drought), or 
a large proportion of a settlement, will be more difficult to overcome than one 
affecting a smaller area (typical of a flood, earthquake, volcanic eruption) 
(Figure 1). People living in these areas must move further away to survive, 
but, most often, they have nowhere to go to escape the disaster. Of course, 
this predicament is exacerbated on small islands (e.g. Easter Island) and on 
densely populated continental areas. In terms of anthropological studies, 
some pronounced cultural changes have been connected to disasters 
encompassing large areas (Torrence and Grattan, 2002). 
1.2.3 Type of society or ecosystem 
A flexible society and/or ecosystem will be able to adapt faster to 
environmental changes and thus suffer less (Figure 1). Societies can increase 
their inflexibility under conditions such as fixed hierarchies where one person 
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cannot replace another, fixed religious rules that impose proscriptions, food 
prohibitions, fewer personal freedoms (e. g. to pursue innovative or parallel 
thinking), or tendencies to reject or despise other ways of life. For example, 
the Norse settlements in Greenland collapsed for various reasons. Because 
they despised the Inuit people, the Norsemen were hindered in learning how 
to survive in Arctic conditions by using skin boats, harpoons for hunting ring 
seal at sea and multilayered skin clothing (Diamond, 2005). 
1.3 Convergence of threats 
A single landslide or earthquake usually will not lead to the collapse of a 
civilisation. However, earthquake storms or clusters, such as occurred at AD 
365 in the eastern Mediterranean area (Stiros, 2001; Ambraseys et al., 1991), 
could have had the capacity for major impacts resulting in collapse of a 
civilisation. The effects of such single natural disasters can be multiplied if 
inflicted on a society that already is stressed by other factors (such as a 
pervasive drought) that makes the society less resilient. For example, a 
succession of changes occurred in Anatolia and the Levant in the fourth to the 
sixth centuries (Heim et al., 1997; Leroy et al., 2002): earthquake storm, 
desertification, population movement, new religion, and shift from farming to 
pastoralism in many places. 
In addition to strictly physical phenomena, social reasons cumulatively may 
cause societal collapse. The five major causes of societal collapse as seen by 
Diamond (2005), include environmental damage, climate change, hostile 
neighbours, loss of relation with friendly partners and cultural responses of the 
people. Of the various cases that he analysed, which included the Anasazi of 
Chaco Canyon at AD 1200, Easter Island at c. AD 1600 (Hunt and Lipo 
(2006) suggest after European contact), Classic Maya period at AD 900 and 
Norse colonies in Greenland at c. AD 1450, only the latter case encompasses 
the five factors. 
1.4 Measuring environmental catastrophes 
There is no absolute, or relative, scale for measuring environmental 
catastrophes. This scale would require combining the strength of a natural 
phenomenon with the impact of a disaster on a society or ecosystem. Where 
natural phenomena may often be quantified, the impacts of disasters are 
immeasurable except by determining the number of deaths (in 2005 the 
Pakistan/India earthquake ranks highest), price of a commodity such as oil, 
insured losses and economic losses (in 2005 Hurricane Katrina ranks highest 
for the latter two measures). 
2 Records of ancient environmental catastrophes  
The full scale of possible rapid environmental changes has not been recorded 
in the short period covered by the instrumental record (DeMenocal 2001; 
Weiss and Bradley, 2001). Therefore it is essential to turn to historical and 
even geological and archaeological archives, which span a much longer 
timescale. In some cases of robust dating or duration control, these archives 
may serve as adequate surrogates for the instrumental record.  
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2.1 Hand of God and first scientific observations 
Ancient societies saw the hand of God in the occurrence of environmental 
catastrophes that appeared unintelligible and, therefore, to have been caused 
by supernatural forces. However by the end of the Archaic Period (800–500 yr 
BC), philosophers already were separating the forces of nature from the 
forces of a superpower; these forces became the subject of scientific 
observation. The philosophers of the Milesian school (city of Miletus, western 
Turkey) in the sixth century BC (Mullen, 1998) laid down the foundation of 
modern science by searching for common physical laws.  
2.2 Documentary evidence  
In Europe, the instrumental record often is considered to have begun by c. AD 
1850. Before that time, very good scientific records were kept in weather 
diaries in continental Europe as far back as c. AD 1500 (Pfister and Wanner, 
2002). In China, documentary evidence (direct or indirect) dates back several 
thousands years (Pfister and Wanner, 2002; Qian et al., 2003). Recent 
initiatives have allowed historians to work with geologists to understand and 
complement ancient records (CLEMENS project of the Agenzia per la 
Protezione dell’Ambiente e per i servizi Technici, Italy). 
2.3 Challenge of multidisciplinarity for improved reliability, dating and duration 
estimates 
Intertwining hard sciences, such as geology, with soft social/human sciences, 
such as history and sociology, commonly still presents great difficulties. 
Researchers representing the hard and soft sciences neither use the same 
investigative techniques, approaches and vocabularies, nor attend the same 
conferences and meetings. However, it is crucial that scientists from both 
areas work together as the field of environmental catastrophe research allies 
both the physical and the social arenas. 
2.3.1 Reliability levels of historical and geological data 
Sources of data should be evaluated, controlled and used to the extent 
applicable. An event may be documented through various types of data: 
religious texts (e.g. the Bible), collection of naïve stories (e.g. the Icelandic 
sagas of twelfth to thirteenth centuries) or instrumental records (e. g. the 
Roda’s Nilometer). These sources of data were not compiled for the same 
purpose and are not of the same quality. The role of historians is to analyse 
these sources and to establish appropriate levels of credibility. The same 
process occurs with the numerous proxies used in geology, including 
palaeoclimatology. Scientists must use extra care when considering data of 
differing levels of certainty; for example, pollen does not record past climate, 
as do stable isotopes, with each proxy having its own merits and limits. 
2.3.2 Dating environmental changes 
If we are to reconstruct and correlate events of global scales, strict 
chronological requirements must be imposed. Indeed, one of the many factors 
necessary to establish causation securely is the close temporal succession of 
cause (hazard) and consequence (disaster).  
Most historical documents are reliable to the year or even to the day 
(Guidoboni et al., 1994). Radiocarbon dating of terrestrial matter, such as 
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seeds or wood, often provides less than fifty years precision, whereas 
radiocarbon dating of geomorphological features such a shoreline feature in 
carbonate-rich sediment, often is less precise than several centuries (sands 
and blocks moved by a tsunami) (Scheffers and Kelletat, 2005). One of the 
most commonly used dating techniques – radiocarbon – is often poorly 
understood and used. The reliability of each date should be examined and 
treated accordingly.  
Baillie (1991) emphasizes that abrupt or ―point‖ events tend to be smeared by 
radiocarbon dating. Thus, radiocarbon effectively conceals abrupt events. The 
converse case occurs when precisely dated events, for example abrupt 
environmental downturns deduced from tree-rings, tend to ―suck in‖ proximate 
but poorly dated evidence. Events may then be turned into periods (Baillie, 
1991). 
2.3.3 Time resolution of proxies 
The last decades of scientific investigation have shown that a significant 
range of geological proxies can provide yearly resolution records: ice cores, 
coral reefs, speleothems, laminated lake and marine sediment and tree-rings 
are the obvious proxies. Other proxies still may provide sequences at a 
resolution high enough to highlight brief phenomena. Geologists working on 
Holocene catastrophes have therefore the potential to reach a time resolution 
directly relevant to societies or even less (such as that of a life time or less). 
2.4 Environmental determinism 
The concept of environmental determinism has in turn been used and 
rejected. The emphasis now is on nature placing constraints on human 
endeavour: a delimiter rather than a prescriptive agent (Coombes and Barber, 
2005). However, recent re-analyses of the collapses of many ancient 
civilisation recently have highlighted the major roles played by rapid and 
catastrophic environmental changes in their final demise, such as in the Old 
Kingdom in Egypt in 2200 cal. yr BC (Hassan, 1997), the Harappans of the 
Indus Valley (c. 2200 cal. yr BC), the Mayas (AD 900), the Tiwanaku (c. AD 
1100) and the Mesopotamians (c. 2200 cal. yr BC) (DeMenocal 2001; Orlove, 
2005). Many ancient, as well as recent, political crises seem to have emerged 
from pressure exerted on people by environmental stresses. Environmental 
determinism is seen again as an important basis for explaining the fall (Weiss 
and Bradley, 2001) and even the rise (Brooks, 2006) of past civilisations and 
societies. 
Another reason to resurrect environmental determinism is linked to the quest 
for understanding natural phenomena in order to prepare better for their next 
occurrence. The palaeosciences aim when possible to establish the time 
when some natural hazards will recur, for example earthquakes and 
hurricanes, to improve predictive models and grasp the full range of 
environmental change. 
2.5 How large were environmental catastrophes in the Holocene? 
According to Coombes and Barber (2005), empirical evidence does not exist 
indicating that world or hemispheric catastrophes with civilisation collapse 
occurred in the Holocene; nonetheless, it still may be possible to uncover 
catastrophes that occurred during this period. Regarding major environmental 
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catastrophes, only a fraction has caused societal collapse. In brief, the 
number of global catastrophes is smaller than we may think, but the number 
of major catastrophes is probably higher than is known. 
Coombes and Barber (2005) only recognise two widespread cultural declines 
that were linked to climatic deteriorations, at 2200 cal. yr BC and at 850 cal. yr 
BC. In the case of 2200 cal. yr BC, the event was highlighted first by the 
sudden Akkadian collapse (empire extending from the headwaters of the 
Tigris and Euphrates Rivers to the Persian Gulf) due to drought. Synchronous 
collapses elsewhere in the world were discovered (Weiss and Bradley, 2001). 
In the case of 850 cal. yr BC (van Geel et al., 2004; 2006), shifts in settlement 
patterns in Western Europe have been assigned to the change to cooler and 
wetter conditions at the Sub-boreal/Sub-atlantic transition (Late Bronze Age). 
A global climatic change, with negative or positive impact on populations 
depending on local conditions, has been attributed to altered production of 14C 
in the atmosphere at that time. Around AD 500, a retreat of agriculture is seen 
clearly both in Northern Europe and the Mediterranean Basin (Berglund, 
2003; Issar, 2004). This decline occurred during the Dark Ages (also known 
as the Great Migration period, or the early Middle Ages) connecting cooling in 
the Atlantic Ocean in the north with a drought, perhaps due to a shift of the 
Intertropical Convergence Zone in the south. 
3 Relevance to modern societies and recovery 
3.1 Why is it relevant to look at ancient societies?  
Some say that modern societies are quite different from ancient societies: 
after all, technology now makes it possible to resist natural hazards more 
effectively (Torrence, 2002). We even are able to predict the future with 
General Circulation Models, as well as anticipate where population growth will 
be the highest (Weiss and Bradley, 2001). 
First, the world population is larger than ever and growing exponentially. 
Hence, with more people at risk, a hazard can become a disaster more 
readily. Although some areas may benefit from hyper-complex technologies, 
other areas, by far the largest segments, will remain marginal and fragile. The 
population expansion itself leads to colonisation of fragile environments that 
are more susceptible to natural hazards. 
Second, societies are complex. Behaviours are more coded, hence causing 
humans to demonstrate less flexibility (Torrence, 2002). It would be 
unthinkable to displace populations in North America and Australia where 
relocation policies have caused immense problems in the past. In addition, 
complexity of laws regulating human interactions is increasing continuously. 
Third, today’s societies rely more on constructed environments (Torrence, 
2002). We often have more possessions that we want to protect. Societies 
with people fixed in cities (e.g. New Orleans) are less resilient than rural 
societies that can move more easily.  
3.2 Causes of failure to respond and to learn 
Diamond (2005) has proposed four reasons why societies fail to respond and 
learn from environmental catastrophes. Incorrect decisions may be made 
because the affected group has failed to a) anticipate the problem before it 
actually occurred, b) perceive a problem when it actually occurred, c) try to 
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solve the problem and finally d) successfully solve the problem. This author 
also provides numerous examples under each category. The most interesting 
reason for failure is the purposeful refusal to solve a problem. This refusal 
may take hold for the following reasons: the group that perceives the problem 
belongs to a different political party, the present situation serves the elite, a 
warning (eruption evacuation) has been given too often thus desensitising the 
society to the potential threat, psychological denial (people living at the foot of 
a dam) and governmental emergency plans that have been set up for fixed 
durations (Diamond, 2005). 
Fires devastated the city of San Francisco after the earthquake of 1906. The 
need to begin rebuilding the city was urgent. In order to attract investment, the 
mayor downplayed the role of the earthquake, even removing the fault from 
geological maps and official photos and paintings in order to focus on the fire 
and thereby fabricate a different social memory. Fire also had devastated 
other cities and therefore was considered an acceptable rationale to rebuild 
by potential investors (UK Channel 4, 2006). 
Another example of failure to learn from environmental catastrophes can be 
seen in the responses to strict anti-seismic building regulations passed by 
both Japan and Turkey, two highly seismic countries. These two populations 
have not been sensitised in the same way. For example, the Turkish people 
are not checking implementation of anti-seismic laws during rebuilding and 
thus the regulations too often are not being applied. Typically, young families 
setting up new homes in Istanbul are not including these regulations amongst 
the criteria used in selecting the ideal locations for their new homes.  
3.3 Recovery from catastrophic environmental events 
How quickly (and by what means) are ecosystems and civilisations able to 
recover from catastrophic environmental events? Recovery could mean 
returning to pre-catastrophic conditions, but also it could mean bringing the 
post-disaster condition to an acceptable level. In any case, recovery should 
attempt to reach a condition that will enable the society to become more 
resilient to a renewed hazard. 
Here it is interesting to address the question not only of recovery but also of 
learning from a catastrophic event. Four potential cases may be envisaged to 
illuminate the questions: (a) A natural hazard has occurred, but it does not 
cause a disaster. In this case, only a few people, such as a remote island 
community, are aware of the natural hazard. There are no sensors in the 
area, and the event hardly enters the instrumental record. (b) Human losses 
result from the event, and afterwards, people try to return to pre-catastrophe 
conditions. (c) Human losses result from the event, but people recover to 
improved conditions in order to minimise further impact. (d) Complete collapse 
results from the event. Hardly anyone survives (or hardly any of the educated 
people) to tell the story to their descendents. Out of these four cases, only 
one represents a society that learned from the event: case (c), which 
represents a society that attempted to find a new balance, better adapted to 
the changing environment. 
3.4 Do we learn?  
It may be argued as a general principle that when intervals between events 
are long, people tend to forget the details unless a written record or an oral 
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tradition are actively maintained alive. To the contrary, when intervals are 
short, memory is transmitted amongst generations, making it is easier to learn 
from experience and thus be prepared. The following paragraphs present 
exceptions to this general principle, as well as several success stories, too. 
Following the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean (>87,000 deaths), the 2005 
hurricane Katrina in New Orleans (>1300 deaths) and the lesser known 2005 
Hurricane Stan in Guatemala (>1500 deaths), the aim of international and 
local aid organisations and local communities was to begin reconstructing 
buildings rapidly, mostly in the exact same locations.  
The 1999 Turkey earthquake required extensive rebuilding, and amazingly 
some structures were rebuilt in exactly the same locations as the previously 
destroyed buildings. However, it is well established that the North Anatolian 
Fault will move again within a lifetime. Hotel Sapanca, built along the shore of 
Lake Sapanca, was destroyed by shaking and subsidence in the lake which 
lies over the North Anatolian Fault. The hotel has been rebuilt through private 
funding six years after the catastrophe, in fact a few meters away from the 
previous location. 
Actual cases where environmental collapse has been avoided are difficult to 
highlight because of the non-linearity inherent in the link between hazard and 
disaster. However, success stories of hazard mitigation fortunately are 
beginning to increase. For example, the rebuilding of a dam upstream of Los 
Angeles after the 1971 San Fernando earthquake followed very strict anti-
seismic regulations, thus a disaster was avoided when the 1994 Northridge 
earthquake occurred (USGS, 2006). The 1971 eruption of the Mount Pinatubo 
Volcano could have killed more than ten thousand people if adequate 
monitoring had not allowed the timely evacuation of the local population 
(USGS, 2006). Another example of successful recovery from a natural 
disaster includes the 1953 flood in the Netherlands and the building of a 
network of protective dams. Most Dutch people live below sea level 
regardless of social status, and consequently society at all levels is concerned 
for the well being of the total population (Diamond, 2005). 
4 Future 
Solutions in the past may have been created to foster myths to explain 
environmental catastrophes and taboos in order to restrict or enforce tribal 
law. These myths and taboos often were originated by the spiritual leader and 
put in place by the tribal leader. Conversely, in modern times, we look for 
solutions based on science and technology, education at all levels, and 
perhaps deep personal change 
4.1 Scientific observation and understanding 
Geoscientists increasingly are participating in environmental geomonitoring, 
as geological changes are occurring not only at the very slow scale of millions 
of years, but also at the very rapid scale of decades if not months. Because 
the latter is often underrated, the International Union of Geological Sciences 
(IUGS) has initiated the project GEOINDICATORS, which aims to assess 
rapid environmental changes in Earth systems (GEOIN, 2006). Intensive 
environmental monitoring (not only of hurricanes, earthquakes and volcanoes, 
but also of beach erosion, salinisation of the water table and karst activity) is 
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necessary to observe how changes are occurring in order to first react quickly, 
and second to understand and improve predictive capacity.  
Depending on the recurrence interval of an event and available funding, we 
should either follow the education and warning system line (low frequency: e. 
g. the tsunami warning network in the eastern Mediterranean Sea) or the 
more costly infrastructure line (high frequency; e g. the Dutch dams built to 
prevent flooding after the major flood of 1953). In parts of the world that still 
have low population densities, creation of nature parks with limited habitations 
could be a solution to limit the impact of disasters by reducing concentrations 
of at-risk populations. 
Sri Lanka was directly affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. The Coast 
Conservation Department very wisely has proposed enactment of new laws 
forbidding building along the coast within a strip 100 to 200 m wide. However 
the opposition political party has suggested another solution based on 
improved infrastructure. However, there is no space for coastal inhabitants to 
relocate inland because the area is already densely settled, and tsunami-
resistant infrastructure would be too expensive. Consequently, even though 
various improvements have been proposed, in the end, people will have to 
rely primarily on a warning system. 
4.2 Education 
As previously stated, education is crucial and should be implemented 
concurrently at three different levels: communication among scientists of 
varying disciplines and creation of a bridge of quality between scientists and 
the media, as well as education for all people. 
4.2.1 Communications among scientific disciplines 
Breaking down the usual barriers between scientific communities in order to 
forge a new mix of people is a challenge. With the demands of academic life, 
scientists often give priority to meetings focusing on their own specialities. 
Scientists must make a special effort to attend thematic and multidisciplinary 
conferences outside their own specialities.  
Geology, a science that conventionally addresses hard rocks, increasingly is 
turning to recent times and high-time resolution, such as a human/societal 
generation (c. 30 years) or less. In addition, archaeology, traditionally an ―Art 
and Humanities‖ subject increasingly is becoming more scientific and turning 
to natural and earth sciences. A new discipline is emerging at the limits of 
those that traditionally did not regularly intermingle. We propose to call this 
new synergy ―the science of environmental catastrophes.‖ 
4.2.2 Creation of a bridge of quality between scientists and the public domain 
This level of education is more difficult to achieve than the preceding level. On 
one hand, scientists are under increasing pressure to publish a maximum 
number of papers and to garner maximum grant awards. Thus, they believe 
that activities connected to public relations and distribution of information to a 
wider audience (media and end users) are not valued by their universities and 
supporting institutions. Scientists, who dedicate considerable time to the 
media, often are poorly considered by their peers because of the compromise 
they must make with scientific rigour in order to disseminate scientific 
information via the media. On the other hand, media personnel tend to 
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oversimplify scientific facts and inflate events to sustain public attention. Most 
media personnel and end-users primarily rely on information quickly gathered 
from short interviews or briefs prepared for them by governmental offices. 
Few have the time to read scientific literature.  
Hence, we must train a new category of people capable of understanding and 
translating core scientific literature, within the limitations of scientific data, for 
the wider public audience, making it comprehensible by the average citizen. 
Therefore, a bridge of quality for transferring technical information from 
scientific journals to the public domain must be nurtured. 
4.2.3 Education of people to mitigate the impacts of a environmental 
catastrophe  
Educating people from the youngest to the oldest is a task for each 
government. Since 1994, Canada and the United States have conducted a 
collaboration regarding warning guidance, mitigation and assessment of 
tsunami hazards. Signs have been installed along the coast, and an education 
programme has been organised by the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation 
Program—a partnership among the U.S. states of Alaska, California, Hawaii, 
Oregon, and Washington and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and U.S. 
Geological Survey (The National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program, 2005). 
The Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System has not realised 
the same success, since some countries have been reticent to share data that 
may have military implications. 
For the Indian Ocean tsunami, two examples where knowledge transmission 
systems proved immensely useful in saving lives can be mentioned. A British 
schoolgirl on holiday in Thailand remembered her geography lesson and 
warned her family and fellow tourists, thus saving them. Many of the 
Andaman and Nicobar tribes, still living as hunters-gatherers on islands with 
some relief, withdrew to high ground and so escaped the worth of the 
tsunami. Traditional knowledge allowed tribesmen on these islands and also 
on Simeulue Island (west of Sumatra) to forecast the consequences of the 
odd ocean behaviour and earthquake. 
4.3 Are we ready to drop some core societal values? 
When methods, such as those identified in the preceding paragraph fail, we 
must turn to a more drastic approach. As suggested by Diamond (2005), a 
society then must be ready to drop some core values such as religious 
beliefs, freedom of expression, equal opportunity, sources of energy or 
income, ideal living or business location, and hierarchy. A good example of 
this concept is the flooding of New Orleans. If the US people were willing to 
drop certain core values, they might consider rebuilding the city on higher 
ground. In the short term, an organised movement of the people would be 
difficult to accept but beneficial in the long term (Orlove, 2005). Migration has 
been a solution in the past to crises brought on by climatic change: US dust 
bowl, Classic Maya collapse, and Viking settlements in Greenland (Orlove, 
2005).  
In some countries because of past cases of forced population displacement, 
for example, in Canada and the United States involving minority groups, the 
idea of displacing a segment of the population cannot be considered without 
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evoking a great outcry! However, uncontrolled movements of populations 
occur all the time: for example, from the south to the north between Mexico 
and the United States, as well as between North Africa and Europe, for 
example on makeshift boats via Gibraltar or via the strait of Sicily. In both 
cases, this migration has been motivated by poorer economies in the 
southern areas, often exacerbated by climatic change and other rapid 
environmental changes. The numbers of people displaced within and out of a 
country owing to natural events is on the increase, because the people have 
to re-settle and often into vulnerable areas, such at the margins of cities (e.g. 
Mexico city) and in camps (e.g. Tristan da Cunha) (Lonergan et al., 1999). 
4.4 New forces driving human adaptability 
Democratic political parties and green movements nowadays are not able to 
convince people of deep environmental changes. Only various radical factions 
currently are convincing or forcing people to change. Regardless, few political 
powers place environmental considerations high on their agendas. A 
successful example of top-down force used to modify practices affecting the 
environment occurred in Japan when the Tokugawa shogunate (seventeen 
century AD) managed to fight deforestation of their island by imposing 
regulations on farmers and modifying building techniques (Diamond, 2005). 
Forces that cause people to leave their homes willingly and rebuild elsewhere 
include prospects for better jobs and lack of insurance coverage to protect 
property and personal belongings. The insurance sector is the world’s largest 
industry and often acts as the messenger of economic impact resulting from 
environmental disasters through the terms and prices of their policies (Mills, 
2005). Although the influence exerted by insurance companies remains 
limited in developing countries, pools for insurance coverage are beginning to 
be set up in countries such as Mexico, Turkey and Ethiopia (Linnerooth-Bayer 
et al., 2005). However, it is quite different in developed countries where 
people have become accustomed to relying heavily on insurance for 
protection against an ever-increasing range of environmental hazards. 
Typically there is a dramatic underestimation of exposure by insurance 
companies, the number of claims increases rapidly and the policies cost is 
increasing (Mills, 2005). 
4.5 The science of environmental catastrophes versus catastrophism 
When the word catastrophe is presented, there is often the danger of falling 
into catastrophism, an area where apocalypse predictors are never far behind 
(Peiser, 2003). Catastrophism is a concept that quickly takes hold due to an 
abundance of media outlets (Web pages, books, videos, public talks) whose 
content often is qualified inappropriately as scientific. 
The science of environmental catastrophes should be based on strong 
scientific methodology, which includes fieldwork, laboratory analyses, 
experimentation, collection of reproducible data, comparisons, and 
hypotheses tested and peer-reviewed. In brief, scientists working in the new 
discipline should use caution vigilantly to avoid an imperceptible slide from 
facts to ―not impossible‖ links, finding the right position between doom 
predictors and scientists who are too cautious. 
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Conclusion 
We must remember that natural events embody tremendous power to cause 
environmental catastrophes, and this power is as great as the power that 
humans possess nowadays to damage their environments. Although the 
number of natural hazards is increasing somewhat, especially 
hydrometeorological events, it is evident that the number of disasters will rise 
dramatically in the near future. Indeed colonisation of marginal environments 
caused by population pressures is placing the world at greater risk from 
natural hazards and catastrophes than ever before. Finally, this new field of 
geosciences is both challenging and fascinating by its relevance to the world 
where we live. To survive, we must learn from the past, adapt to 
environmental changes, and modify our life styles in front of a darkening 
nature. 
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